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Social Media - Populism 
• Identifying populist communication 
• Identification of different populist communication: content & style  [Engesser, Ernst, Esser & Büchel 2017; Bracciale & Martella 2017] 
• Populistic style “agitation, spectacular acts, exaggeration, calculated provocations, intended breech of taboos” [Pauwels 
2011] 
 
• Party/candidate positioning 
• Candidates from parties on extreme (right/left) & oppositional candidates are more populist [Ernst et al 2017] 
 
• New media logic:  
• virality, popularity: messages that produce likes, comments, promote, and share within the networks [Klinger & Svensson 2015; 
Klinger 2013] 
• Primary (opinion leaders) and secondary audience [Vaccari & Valeriani 2015; Karlsen 2015] 
• Relation social media – populist vote choice  
• > passive receivers of news more likely to choose populist candidates, active receivers less likely to choose populists [Groshek& Koc-
Michalska 2017] 
• Facebook affordances 
• Opportunity for dialogue and interactivity >> SM (TW) are not used for interactive horizontal communication but reproduce 
top-down communication; in Latin America context populists attack critical journalists, social media users and citizens 
[Waisbord & Amado 2017] 
• Interactivity of the profile owner amplifies citizens’ reactions (likes/shares/comments) [Koc-Michalska et al 2016] 
 
Populist communication - content 
Engesser, Ernst, Esser & Büchel (2017), Ernst, Engesser, Buchel, Blassing, Esser (2017) 
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE 
PEOPLE 
• the speaker refers to the people as the theoretical origin of power 
in democracy 
  • the speaker demands more power for the people and he explicitly 
promotes the implementation of direct-democratic elements 
ADVOCATING FOR THE PEOPLE • presenting party as true and only representative of real people 
ATTACKING THE ELITES • Political elites 
  • Economic elites 
  • Media elites 
  • Supranational elites (EU)  
  • Legal elites 
OSTRACIZM • message listing the groups that party do not see as part of the 
society (e.g. migrants, voters for other party etc.) 
  • message accusing other parties to claim party (owner of the wall) 
of the ostracism (e.g. being fascists, populists etc.) 
INVOKING THE HEARTLAND • message using historical symbolism or events to underline the 
negative policy of other parties putting people at risk 
COMBINING THE PEOPLE AND 
THE ELITE 
• message presenting other parties as NON-representatives of the 
people 
  • message presenting the party (owner of the wall) as the only 
representative of people 
STAGECRAFT  emotions • highly emotional (positive or negative) 
informality • a direct, non-formal and non-institutional style 
intimization • the 'unofficial stories', not known to general public  
negative affect • appeal to emotion of fear - to mobilize around negative feeling 
simplification • oversimplifying issues or solutions 
storytelling • using language full of non-precision, allusions, puns and empty rhetoric, 
proverbs, stereotypes, clichés and expression of “popular wisdom” 
taboo breaker • breaking the rules of political correctness, being impolite to distinguish a 
party from other parties 
vulgarism • using vulgar language (to reach 'ordinary people') 
‘REGISTER’ DIMENSION • using aggressive and provocative language 
  • language is informative/neutral 
  • language is ironic 
  • message is encouraging to further discussion and participation in 
conversation (asking questions, asking to comments etc.) 
‘TOPIC’ DIMENSION • POLICY ISSUES that should be resolved (often local or episodic, 
individual) that should be resolved fast 
  • PERSONAL LIFE of a candidate or politician from other party 
  • CURRENT EVENTS which are not political but on actuality (from sport, 
events, news) 
  • CAMPAIGNING how campaign is managed and on performance during 
the campaign) 
Populist communication - style 
Bracciale & Martella (2017) 
Research questions  
[RQ1.] Populism in content and in style was used according to  
 >> party economic and cultural populism index 
 >> left-right ideological dimension 
 >> party size 
 >> party position (pro/anti EU; opposition/government) 
 
[RQ2.] Possible relation of populism in content and in style with community 
activity (likes and shares) and interactivity (comments), controlling for 
Facebook affordances. 
Methodology 
14 days before 2014 European Parliament election 
 
14 EU countries > 112 parties  > 11300 posts  
 sample 40% proportionally per country = 4500 
 problems (regional languages: Catalan, Irish Gaelic, no CHES code per party) > N= 3696 
 
content analysis - human coding > 18 coders 
 
Chapel Hill Expert Study: L/R ideology  
  Populism measurement [Inglehart & Norris 2016] 
 
 
Sotrender: archiving tool  
Populism measurements 
• Inglehart & Norris 2016  CHES: 
 
 
 
CHES 2014 or 2010 > Index average score per party 
(-5) Libertarian/postmaterialist   (+5) traditional/authoritarian 
  Populism Cultural Index Relative PCIR (a+…+j)/9 
  Populism Economic Index Relative PEIR (a +..+d)/4 
Source: Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2015. "2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey." Version 2015.1. 
Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
Cultural populism (party average per country) 
Inglehart & Norris 2016  CHES 
nd  LEFT                RIGHT  
M= -.36 (SD 2.5) 
Min -3.9 Max 4.2 
Economic populism 
nd  LEFT                RIGHT  
M= -.44 (SD 2.2) 
Min -4.7 Max 4.6 
Populism in content 
• 31% of posts contained at least one populistic item 
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Populism in content and in style by Party ID 
Ernst, Engesser, Buchel, Blassing, Esser (2017) 
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Community response to Populism in style and in content 
• controlling for 
• Country fix effects 
• Facebook affordances  
• post format (photo/video/link/text, interactions),  
• time of post (days/hour),  
• time till election,  
• time from and till next/previous post,  
• previous reactions,  
• hourly-daily reactions 
• Party characteristics (size / ID position / EU position / gov-opp)  
 
 
Negative binomial regression 
 
    LIKE SHARE COMMENT 
RESPONSE from party  .422 *** .466 *** .779 *** 
Populism in content 
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE 
people as the origin of power             
demand more power for the people         
ADVOCATING FOR THE PEOPLE party as true representative of people             
ATTACKING THE ELITES 
Political elites             
Economic elites             
Media elites         -.408 ** 
Supranational elites         -.335 ** 
Legal elites         
 OSTRACIZM 
anti  (them)     .595 **     
accusing of the ostracism             
INVOKING THE HEARTLAND historical symbolism             
COMBINING THE PEOPLE AND THE 
ELITE 
  
other parties as NON-representatives of 
the people 
            
party as only true representative of 
people 
.372 ** .510 ** .594 ** 
Populism in style 
STAGECRAFT  
emotions .353 *** .464 *** .304 *** 
Informality     .145 ** 
intimization (unofficial story)     .399 ** 
negative affect (fear)         .419 ** 
simplification .442 ** .295 ** 
storytelling         -.266 * 
taboo breaker         .587 ** 
vulgarism         .461 ** 
  
‘REGISTER’ DIMENSION 
aggressive language             
ironic language         .635 *** 
encouragement to further discussion         .601 ** 
              
Party Economic Populism Index .071 *     .073 ** 
Party Cultural Populism Index .116 *         
Conclusion 
• Populism in content or in style is present in 1/3 of the communication made 
via Facebook by political parties > the comparison with the leaders populist 
communication is not that clear 
• Major fringe parties (on the edge of getting into the national parliament) are 
more likely to use populistic style, extreme right wing parties use populism 
more, however the pattern is not that clear across the ideological spectrum;  
• populism in content is more evenly distributed among parties (regardless of 
characteristic) than populism in style 
• Using economic/cultural cleavages (CHES) the ‘populist parties’ (in content 
and in style) are on extreme right on vertical scale (cultural) but rather 
neutral economically 
• Taking separately each item of populism in content or in style ‘xenophobia’ 
is the only item distinctive for populist parties (culturally, still not for all of 
them) >> for other populistic elements, more centered parties also adapt 
them to their communication strategies 
 
• Populist communication has almost no influence on Facebook community 
activity (liking or sharing) > with the exception for ‘us-them’ elements 
• Community interactivity (comments) is influenced mainly by populism in 
style (except for storytelling “bullshitting”?) 
• Consistent influence of emotional tone of the post and Representing The 
People elements on community activity and interactivity 
 
 
Thank you 
